We argue that international lenders take into account that taxes (or subsidies) a¤ect borrowers'income available for debt repayments. Using an endowment-economy model, we show that by incorporating this fact into the analysis of …nancial crises from the pecuniary externality perspective, ex-post interventions are completely ine¤ective to manage crises and, instead, ex-ante capital controls are useful for correcting the externality that stems from the underestimation of the social costs of decentralized debt decisions.
Introduction
In a recent strand of literature, based on a now common theoretical framework proposed by Mendoza (2002) , …nancial crises are studied from a pecuniary externality perspective in which the negative e¤ects arise from the combination of the fact that private agents do not internalize the contribution of their debt decisions to prices and the presence of an occasionally binding credit constraint.
The crisis of 2008 has brought a renewed interest among academics and policy makers on the bene…ts of macroprudential policies and restrictions on capital ‡ows as a way to mitigate the e¤ects of …nancial crises, specially in emerging economies. Most of the theoretical literature on this subject intends to give a welfare foundation to the role of capital controls and ex-ante interventions (e.g., Korinek, 2010 Korinek, , 2011 Bianchi, 2011) . Benigno et al. (2013a) , in the context of a production small open economy, …nd that both ex-ante and ex-post interventions are needed, although ex-post policies entail larger welfare gains than ex-ante policies do. Benigno et al. (2013b Benigno et al. ( , 2014 discuss the e¤ectiveness of ex-ante and ex-post interventions and show that a credible commitment to ex-post policies always welfare-dominates ex-ante interventions, as they can achieve the unconstrained allocation (i.e. crises can be avoided).
In this series of papers, the standard credit constraint is expressed in such a way that the amount that can be borrowed (D t ) is limited to a fraction ( ) of the borrower's current income (Y t ):
This constraint can be motivated (e.g. Korinek, 2010) as an incentive compatibility constraint that avoids losses for lenders when …nancial markets are subject to moral hazard problems. If, for any reason, borrowers decided to default, international lenders could go to court; however, due to imperfect legal enforcement or, say, the existence of a non-seizable proportion of assets, lenders can recover at most a fraction ( ) of borrowers' income. As a consequence, domestic agents can borrow only up to the amount that lenders can be sure they would recover in case of default.
The standard credit constraint could be modi…ed to take into account that, in practice, in assessing the borrowing capacity, lenders consider other variables 1 such as the expected future income or outstanding debt. These changes may introduce computational di¢ culties for solving models and therefore, in general, the credit constraint is kept in its standard form for the sake of simplicity or model tractability. However, in some scenarios, the form of this constraint is crucial to determine the e¤ectiveness of a policy action.
As in the papers mentioned above, di¤erent policies have been analyzed in order to check whether or not the government can correct the externality or even to prevent crises. It has been common practice to analyze the e¤ect of these policies as if the …nancial constraint were immune to those policies. However, they often imply imposing taxes or subsidies, and therefore may a¤ect disposable income and, in turn, debt repayment capacity. For instance, consider an economy in which the government subsidizes private consumption and …nance this action through a lump-sum tax on private agents. The subsidy will have an e¤ect on the borrowers'planned expenditure which in the end a¤ects debt decisions. This e¤ect is already incorporated into the standard constraint through changes in the level of debt D t . However, this constraint does not consider the fact that the lump-sum tax reduces the disposable income of debtors. The lender knows that if he goes to court when a borrower defaults, he can recover a fraction of seizable income since taxes must be discounted to be paid to the government.
In this document, we show that by appropriately modifying the …nancial constraint so that it depends on disposable income, the exchange rate policy becomes ine¤ective to manage crises, and instead capital controls do implement the social planner allocation.
The Model and Results
We use a standard theoretical framework widely used for the analysis of …nancial crises and capital controls in a small open economy subject to an ocassionally-binding credit constraint.
A continuum of mass one of identical households maximize the utility function 2
where is the discount factor, u ( ) is the period utility function and C t is the consumption index which aggregates tradable (T ) and nontradable (N ) goods
Every period, each household receives a stochastic bundle of tradable and nontradable goods, Y T t and Y N t . Households also have access to the international …nancial market through one-period bonds B t+1 (B t+1 < 0 implies debt) at an interest rate r (R 1 + r). The budget constraint, expressed in units of tradable goods, is:
where P N t is the price of nontradable goods and the price of tradable goods has been normalized to one. 1=P N t can be interpreted as the real exchange rate. The …rst order conditions for the problem related to Equations (1)- (3), in the absence of a credit constraint (and hence we refer to it as the 'never-constrained'economy), with respect to C T t , C N t and B t+1 are, respectively:
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The marketclearing conditions for nontradables and tradables, respectively, are:
Since C N t is already determined by Equation (7), the solution for the other endogenous variables of the never-constrained economy (which we denote using the superscript , i.e. C T t , :
where Equation (12) was obtained from Equations (4) and (5). Notice that we can solve for C T t , t and B t+1 using Equations (9)- (11), and then we can solve for P N t using Equation (12).
To introduce the ocasionally-binding …nancial constraint we assume that access to international …nancial markets is imperfect, and therefore there is limited access to credit up to a fraction of current income:
This is the standard …nancial constraint widely used in the literature. With this additional restriction, we introduce an additional variable, t , the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint. For this model, the solution for C T t , t , t , B t+1 and P N t can be obtained from the following equation system (given
If, in period t, the economy is unconstrained, t = 0 and hence, from Equation (18), B t+1
. If, instead, the economy is constrained in that period, t 0 and B t+1 =
Like in the related literature, we interpret those periods in which the economy is constrained as 'crisis'periods. The presence of the …nancial constraint and the private underestimation of the social cost of debt decisions have distortionary consequences for the decentralized equilibrium, and hence the government intervention may improve social welfare. The government may adopt ex-post (crisis management) or ex-ante (macroprudential) policies.
Ex-post policy
Suppose that the government imposes a subsidy t < 0 (which is only e¤ective when, in the absence of such subsidy, there would be crisis) on nontradable consumption, which is returned by the household through a lump-sum tax T t . Similarly to Benigno et al. (2013b Benigno et al. ( , 2014 we interpret this policy as an exchange rate intervention.
The new budget constraint is
The government follows a balance-budget …scal policy every period:
We show that, similarly to Benigno et al. (2014) , the government can use the subsidy on consumption to achieve the never-constrained allocation.
Proposition 1 If there exists a solution for a never-constrained economy described by Equations (1)-(3), then for an economy with …nancial constraint described by Equations (1), (2), (13), (19) and (20) there exists a value of subsidy on nontradable consumption, t , for every period t, such that the decentralized economy achieves C T t , t and B t+1 (and hence the economy is never constrained).
Proof. Suppose the statement is false, and as a result it is not possible to …nd a value of t consistent with the solution of the equation system of the never-constrained economy.
For the economy with …nancial constraint described in the proposition, the system of equations that solves for C T t , t B t+1 and P N t when assuming that it will never be constrained thanks to the subsidy is:
Notice that Equations (21)- (23) are the same as the original ones in the never-constrained economy: Equations (9)-(11). Since we can solve for C T t , t and B t+1 independently of P N t , the solution implies that C T t = C T t , t = t and B t+1 = B t+1 . Then, for the proposition being false, any value of t should be inconsistent with this solution, i.e. the …nancial constraint must be binding. However, by substituting the equation for P N t in the …nancial constraint (13):
and solving for t :
where
we …nd that any t that satis…es this condition allows the decentralized economy to achieve the never-unconstrained allocation.
The above result implies not only that the government is able to avoid crises but also that if it were its purpose to maximize the debt capacity of the economy, it could do it without limit: from Equation (25) it follows that when the subsidy approaches 1, the debt capacity of the economy tends to in…nity. This analysis implicitly assumes that international lenders su¤er from a sort of …scal illusion since they do not take into account that at the moment of debt repayment households have to pay taxes and this reduces their income available for debt repayments. If lenders incorporate this fact, it seems more appropriate to consider the following …nancial constraint:
The next proposition shows that if the credit constraint is instead represented by Equation (26) the exchange rate intervention is then completely ine¤ective.
Proposition 2 In the economy described by Equations (1), (2), (19), (20) and (26), a subsidy on nontradable consumption t has no impact on the equilibrium values of C T t , t , t and B t+1 , and hence the government cannot use such subsidy to implement the never-constrained allocation.
Proof. Suppose the economy is initially constrained. The …rst three equations of the system, (14)- (16), remain the same. The …nancial constraint is binding, i.e. B t+1 = Y T t + P N t Y N t + T t and the equation for P N t is
Substituting Equations (7) and (20) into the …nancial constraint (26) yields
By substituting Equation (27) into (28) we obtain:
which is the same as the equation that results from (17) and (18), when the economy is constrained. Then, the equilibrium values of C T t , t , t and B t+1 for this economy are exactly the same as those that can be obtained from the model without t , Equations (14)- (18).
With a …nancial constraint of the form in Equation (26), the exchange rate intervention not only cannot avoid crises but also does not a¤ect the constrained economy at all.
Social Planner Equilibrium
Since private agents have an insigni…cant impact on the market, they make decisions taking prices as given. Instead, a benevolent Social Planner (SP) with restricted planning abilities (i.e. the SP is subject to the same …nancial constraint as private agents) internalizes the e¤ect of borrowing decisions on prices. By following the constrained-e¢ ciency criterion 3 , we assume that the SP is constrained by the same pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium, and therefore it takes into account the e¤ect of his consumption decisions on Equation (17).
The …rst order conditions for the SP problem are (in addition to the pricing rule (17) and the market-clearing conditions (7) and (8)):
(30)
As previous literature has shown (e.g. Bianchi, 2011; Korinek, 2011; Parra-Polania and Vargas, 2015) , the SP improves social well-being by choosing a lower level of debt to enhance future levels of liquidity and borrowing capacity and therefore to mitigate the negative ampli…cation e¤ects of previous debt on the economy under crisis. The SP planner equilibrium can be implemented in a decentralized economy by means of a macro-prudential tax (i.e. only e¤ective in normal times) on debt.
Macro-prudential Policy
Suppose the government, in the decentralized economy, imposes a macroprudential tax t < 0 on debt ( t = 0 when the economy is under crisis, i.e. constrained), which is returned to the household through a lump-sum transfer T t . The budget constraint in …nancially unconstrained periods is
The next proposition shows a standard result in the related literature when using the standard …nancial constraint: a macroprudential tax t on debt implements the SP allocation in a decentralized economy.
Proposition 3 In the economy described by Equations (1), (2), (13), (32) and (33) there exists a value of t , such that the government implements the SP allocation in the decentralized economy.
Proof. First, notice that when the economy is constrained ( t 0, t = 0), we can solve for C T;SP t and B SP t+1 from Equations (31) and (8). These are exactly the same as those values of C T t and B t+1 that solve the system (16)- (18), for a given state
shows that, when the economy is …nancially constrained, the SP allocation coincides with the decentralized-economy allocation (C T;SP t = C T t and B SP t+1 = B t+1 ). However, the valuation of liquidity di¤ers: by comparing Equations (29) and (14),
and hence the SP valuation of liquidity, under crisis, is greater: SP t t . In normal (unconstrained) periods ( t = 0), if there were no tax, although Equations (29), (30) and (8) (14)- (16), they do not produce the same equilibrium, due to the di¤erence in the valuation of liquidity during crisis, i.e. E t SP t+1 6 = E t t+1 . To implement the SP allocation in the decentralized economy, we introduce a tax t on debt such that:
(from (14) and (15)) becomes equal to:
(from (29) and (30)). It can be veri…ed that the expression for such tax is 4
Now we show that if lenders take into account the e¤ect of taxes on income available for debt repayments, the expression for the macroprudential tax t that implements the SP allocation in a decentralized economy does not change.
Proposition 4 In the economy described by Equations (1), (2), (26), (32) and (33) macroprudential tax on debt that satis…es (37).
Proof. Notice that the only change in this economy, with respect to the one in the previous proposition, is the inclusion of T t = t B t+1 in the …nancial constraint. As t = 0 during crises, there is neither change in the corresponding equation system in those periods nor in the probability of crisis. 5 In normal times, the …nancial constraint is di¤erent, but it is not a relevant equation for the corresponding system.
Conclusion
Previous literature has studied …nancial crises in the context of an open economy which faces an occasionally binding …nancial constraint. When the constraint is binding, limited access to credit forces agents to reduce consumption. The negative e¤ect on welfare becomes greater due to the feedback between the presence of the constraint and the fact that private agents do not internalize the contribution of their debt decisions to prices. Under such circumstances, there may be room to improve social welfare by government interventions.
Some papers (e.g. Korinek, 2010 Korinek, , 2011 Bianchi, 2011; Parra-Polania and Vargas, 2015) show that ex-ante or macroprudential policies (e.g. a tax on debt in normal times) can correct the externality that arises from the underestimation, by private agents, of the social cost of debt. A macroprudential tax increases the private cost of debt and makes it equal to the social cost. Other papers (e.g. Benigno et al. 2013b Benigno et al. , 2014 ) also …nd that ex-post or crisismanagement policies (e.g. an exchange rate intervention) may be even more e¤ective because they completely avoid crises rather than only preventing the greater impact that results from the abovementioned externality. An exchange rate intervention has a positive e¤ect on the price of collateral and, in turn, increases debt capacity.
The above results are found under the assumption that government policies do not alter the con…guration of the …nancial constraint. However, such policies imply imposing taxes or subsidies which a¤ect disposable income, and thus debt repayment capacity. If a borrower defaults, the lender knows that if he goes to court he will recover a fraction of seizable income because taxes must be discounted to be paid to the government.
The present paper analyzes …nancial crises in the context of a standard framework but modi…es the …nancial constraint to consider that, in assessing debt capacity, lenders take into account that taxes a¤ect the seizable income of borrowers. As a result of this change, we …nd that ex-post policies are totally ine¤ective while macroprudential policies preserve their ability to correct the externality in a decentralized economy. Although an exchange rate intervention 5 Each period, given a value of B Therefore the probability of crisis is the probability that B increases the price of collateral by subsidizing consumption, this subsidy is returned to the government by transfers and, in the end, there is no e¤ect on borrowing capacity. Instead, a macroprudential tax on debt, under the modi…ed …nancial constraint, is still able to increase the cost of debt for private agents.
